Allocation rules on networks by Ilkilic, Rahmi & Kayi, Cagatay
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Allocation rules on networks
Rahmi Ilkilic and Cagatay Kayi
Bilkent University, Universidad del Rosario - Facultad de Economı´a
March 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37305/
MPRA Paper No. 37305, posted 13. March 2012 00:00 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SERIE DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 
No. 118 
Marzo 2012 
ALLOCATION RULES ON NETWORKS  
 
 
 
 
 
Rahmi  Ilkiliç  
Çâğatay Kayi 
 
Allocation Rules on Networks∗
Rahmi I˙lkılıc¸† and C¸ag˘atay Kayı‡
Abstract
When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints
have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing
a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource
to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts
the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the
supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the
question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens.
We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network
constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The
simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount
of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and
resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treat-
ment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend
fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that
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for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with
respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robust-
ness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm
and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is
pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give appli-
cations of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism,
proportionality and equal sacrifice.
Keywords: Networks, Claims Problems, Egalitarianism, Proportionality, Equal Sac-
rifice.
JEL–Numbers: D61, D85, Q20.
1 Introduction
The world has become a densely connected network, especially for markets and
natural resources. Given geographical or infrastructural constraints, it is important
to understand how scarce resources should be allocated. An example where such
network constraints are essential is fresh water resources. As a result of increasing
population and developing economies, there is a growing need for water. The
principal problem is to have an efficient and fair allocation of resources (Ansink and
Weikard, 2009; Hoekstra, 2006). Some other examples are aid relief during disaster
situations (O¨zdamar et al., 2004), common property fisheries (I˙lkılıc¸, 2007), and
the distribution of utilities like electricity and natural gas when there is a supply
shock.
We study the problem of distributing a resource through a bipartite network
between citizens with positive claims, needs, or entitlements and sources that are
endowed with a limited amount of the desired resource. If there is a link between
a source and a citizen, then the citizen can receive the resource from the source.
Each source has a limited supply of the resource and each citizen has a claim
on the resource. Given the network constraints, the demand of citizens, and the
supplies at each source, the question is how to allocate the resource among the
citizens. An allocation rule assigns to each citizen a quantity of resource satisfying
the following feasibility constraints: First, a citizen can not receive more than his
demand. Second, a source can not deliver more than its supply.
We study those problems where total demand exceeds total supply where all
the agents suffer from the scarcity.1 When individuals have claims on a resource
1If there is a group of agents on the network whose claims can be completely satisfied
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that sum up to more than what is available, how should the resource be divided?
This problem is a claims problem, formally introduced by O’Neill (1982). Several
rules are commonly used in practice and analyzed in theoretical work (Thomson,
2003, 2006).
An allocation problem is defined by the supplies at the sources, the claims of
citizens, and the network. The question is how to allocate the resources among
the citizens. First, we define a simple allocation problem that is free of network
constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed between the agents.
The simple allocation problem is in fact a claims problem. We focus on a subset of
rules in claims problems. A rule satisfies equal treatment of equals if two citizens
with equal claims receive equal amounts. A rule is resource monotonic if when the
resource increases, each citizen receives at least as much as he did initially. For
the next property, suppose a rule has been applied to a claims problem and some
citizens leave with what they are prescribed by the rule. If we apply the rule to the
problem with the remaining citizens and the remaining resources, then the initial
prescribed allocation should not change for the remaining ones. A rule is consistent
if it satisfies this invariance property.
We refer to the rules that are consistent and resource monotonic satisfying
equal treatment of equals as fairness principles. We extend fairness principles to
allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network,
the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition
pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm
to extend a fairness principle to an allocation rule which is pairwise robust with
respect to the fairness principle (Theorem 1). This algorithm is parallel to the
ascending algorithms used in Moulin (1999) and Bochet et al. (2010, 2011). Then,
we show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust
with respect to the fairness principle (Theorem 2).
The literature on flow sharing on networks has focused on computation of egali-
tarian solutions (Megiddo, 1974, 1977; Brown, 1979; Hall and Vohra, 1993). Several
allocation rules for allocation problems on networks have recently been introduced
and axiomatized in Branzei et al. (2008), Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten (2010), Bochet
et al. (2010, 2011), and Moulin and Sethuraman (2011).
Branzei et al. (2008) represent a claims problem as a standard flow problem
on a simple network and implement some known rules via suitable cost functions
in the related minimum cost flow problem. Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten (2010) provide
without any burden on others, we can simply take those agents put of the network and
focus on the “genuine” problem
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an extension of two simple allocation rules (the contested-garment rule and the
constrained equal awards rule) by applying to each two person problem.
Bochet et al. (2010) study the egalitarian rule for allocation problems on net-
works, which they characterize with Pareto optimality, equal treatment of equals
and strategy-proofness. Their egalitarian rule is an extension of the uniform rule
(Sprumont, 1991) for the simple allocation problem to an allocation problem on net-
works in an agent consistent way, meaning if an agent leaves the problem with her
share and the corresponding amounts are reduced from the sources she received her
share, then in the remaining network the agents should receive the same amounts
as in the original problem. Our aim in this paper is to extend all consistent and
resource monotonic rules satisfying equal treatment of equals for the simple prob-
lem to a network allocation problem in an agent consistent manner. Our pairwise
robustness captures this consistency requirement.
Moulin and Sethuraman (2011) provides an alternative extension of simple al-
location rules in a source consistent fashion, meaning if a source leaves the problem
with its resources and the corresponding amounts are reduced from the agents
receiving them, then the new problem should allocate the agents the shares they
received in the original problem plus the amounts allocated from the deleted source.
Bochet et al. (2011) studies the problem of balancing the demands and supplies be-
tween agents where links depict the transfer from a supplier to a demander. That
is different from a classic allocation problem as the agents receive the commodity
they desire from other agents (Klaus et al., 1997, 1998).
The allocation problem we study is different from models where agents are
located sequentially on a line or the so-called river sharing (Ambec and Sprumont,
2002; Ambec and Ehlers, 2008; Ansink and Weikard, 2011). A river sharing problem
can be written as an allocation problem on a network where agents’ access to sources
are hierarchical.2 Hence our model is more general than a river sharing problem as
we have no restrictions on the possible networks between sources and agents. Our
model is also different than the division of a single commodity supplied by multiple
sources as studied in Kar and Kıbrıs (2008). There, although an agent, a priori,
can consume from any source, she must receive all her endowment from a single
2In more detail, the river sharing can be written as an allocation problem on a network
in the following manner. The initial stream reaching the first agent on the river and the
rainfall received by every agent are the sources in our network. The last agent on the river
has access to all sources. The second from the last agent has access to all sources except
the rainfall of the last agent and in general an agent has access to all sources except the
rainfall of her downstream agents.
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source whereas an agent in our model can receive her share from several sources
which she has access to.
In Section 2, we introduce the model and some properties of fairness principles.
In Section 3, we present the algorithm and give the results. In Section 4, we give
three applications of the algorithm. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
Let S be the set of sources and |S| = m, and C be the set of citizens and |C| = n.
Each source t ∈ S has a non-negative supply st ∈ R+ and each citizen i ∈ C
has a non-negative claim ci ∈ R+ for the resource.
Let s = (s1, s2, ..., sm) be the supply vector and c = (c1, c2, ..., cn) be the claims
vector. The sources and citizens are embedded in a network in which citizens can
acquire the resource only from the sources they are connected to. A bipartite
graph g ⊆ S × C consists of links between nodes in S and C. If a link connects
a source t to a citizen i in g, i.e., ti ∈ g, then it is possible for citizen i to acquire
the resource from source t. We assume that g is connected. If it is not, then we
can treat each connected component of g as a separate problem. Let Gn×m be the
set of all connected bipartite graphs between S and C.
A subgraph of g is a graph g(T,D) ⊆ g such that T ⊆ S, D ⊆ C and each
link in g that connects a source in T to a citizen in D is a member of g(T,D), i.e.,
g(T,D) = g ∩ (T ×D). For a subgraph g(T,D) of g, we denote by g(S\T,C\D),
the subgraph of g that results when we remove all nodes in T ∪ D from g. Let
Ng(T) be the set of citizens connected to the set of sources T in g; Ng(T ) =
{i ∈ C such that ti ∈ g for some t ∈ T}. Similarly, Ng(D) be the set of sources
connected to the set of citizen D in g; Ng(D) = {t ∈ S such that ti ∈ g for some i ∈
D}.
An allocation is a vector q = (q1, q2, ..., qn) ∈ Rn+ showing how much resource
is allocated to each citizen. A transfer of resources, or simply a flow, is a vector φ
∈ RS×D+ , where φti is the amount sent from source t to citizen i such that if ti /∈ g,
then φti = 0.
An allocation q is feasible if there is a flow φ ∈ RS×D+ that supports it, i.e., for
each citizen i ∈ C, qi =
∑
t∈Ng(i) φti and for each source t ∈ S,
∑
i∈Ng(t) φti ≤ st.
An allocation q is efficient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation
q′ such that for each citizen i ∈ C, we have ci ≥ q′i ≥ qi and
∑
i q
′
i >
∑
i qi. A
feasible allocation q satisfies claim boundedness if for each citizen i ∈ C, qi ≤ ci.
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An allocation problem is a triple R = (s, c, g) such that
for all T ⊂ S,
∑
t∈T
st <
∑
i∈Ng(T )
ci
Note that no subset of sources has enough resource to satisfy the claims of the
citizens connected to them. Hence, the allocation problem is “genuine” in the sense
that a citizen receives the resource always at the expense of some other citizen.
Let R= Rm+ × Rn+ × Gm×n be the set of allocation problems. See Figure 1 for an
example of an allocation problem.
t t t t
t t t t t t
s1 = 1 s2 = 1 s3 = 2 s4 = 2
c1 = 1 c2 = 1 c3 = 1 c4 = 2 c5 = 3 c6 = 5
g
Figure 1: An example of an allocation problem: R = (s, c, g) is an
allocation problem with S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, C = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, s = (1, 1, 2, 2), and c =
(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5).
An allocation rule ϕ is a function which assigns to each allocation problem
(s, c, g) an efficient allocation that satisfies claim boundedness. Since each rule
assigns an allocation to each problem, there is a flow supporting that allocation.
If φ(s, c, g) is a flow that supports ϕ(s, c, g), then for each citizen i, ϕi(s, c, g) =∑
t∈Sg(i) φti(s, c, g).
A simple allocation problem is a pair P = (c, ω) such that
∑
i∈C ci ≥ ω.
Note that P represents the problem of allocating an amount ω ≥ 0 among the
citizens in C. There is no restriction on the possible flows and ω can be distributed
freely to citizens. Let P = Rm+ × R+ be the set of simple allocation problems.
A rule f is a function which assigns to each simple allocation problem (c, ω)
an efficient allocation, i.e.,
∑
i∈C fi(c, ω) = ω that satisfies claim boundedness, i.e.,
for each i ∈ C, fi(c, ω) ≤ ci.
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A rule f satisfies equal treatment of equals if for each simple allocation
problem (c, ω) and each pair of citizens i, j ∈ C with ci = cj , we have fi(c, ω) =
fj(c, ω), i.e. two citizens with equal claims receive equal amounts.
For the next property, suppose a rule has been applied to a claims problem
and some citizens leave with what they are prescribed by the rule. If we apply the
rule to the problem with the remaining citizens and the remaining resource, then
the initial prescribed allocation does not change for the remaining ones. A rule is
consistent if it satisfies this invariance property. Formally, a rule f is consistent
if for each simple allocation problem (c, ω), each D ⊂ C, and each i ∈ C\D,
fi(c−D, ω −
∑
j∈D
fj(c, ω)) = fi(c, ω)
where c−D is the claims vector of the citizens in C\D.
A rule is resource monotonic if when the resource increases, each citizen receives
at least as much as he did initially. A rule f is resource monotonic if for each
pair of simple allocation problems (c, ω) and (c, ω′) with ω′ > ω and each i ∈ C,
we have fi(c, ω
′) ≥ fi(c, ω).
We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that
satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles. Our aim
is to extend each fairness principle to an allocation rule on a network. We require
the extension to conserve the essence of the fairness principle. We formalize this
requirement by the following definition:
Pairwise f-Robustness: Given an allocation problem (s, c, g) and a fairness
principle f , an allocation q is pairwise f -robust if for each pair of citizens i, j ∈
C with f((ci, cj), qi + qj) = (q
∗
i , q
∗
j ), there exists no feasible allocation q
′ for the
allocation problem (s, c, g) such that for each k 6= i, j, q′k = qk and
|q∗i − q′i| < |q∗i − qi|.
An allocation rule ϕ is pairwise f -robust if for each allocation problem (s, c, g) ∈
R, ϕ(s, c, g) = q satisfies pairwise f -robustness.
Next, we construct an algorithm to extend any fairness principle f to an al-
location rule ϕf that is pairwise f -robust. Then, we show that for each fairness
principle f , there exists a unique allocation rule which is pairwise f -robust.
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3 The Ascending Algorithm
Let f be a fairness principle. Given the claims of the citizens c, consider the
simple allocation problem with a single source of capacity ω ≥ 0. For each citizen
i, let fi(c, ω) be the amount that citizen i ∈ C would have received under the
fairness principle f in the simple allocation problem (c, ω). Note that by resource
monotonicity, fi(c, ω) is an increasing function of ω.
We obtain the allocation rule ϕf (s, c, g) by an ascending algorithm based on
the following system K(ω) of inequalities where ω is a non-negative parameter:
∑
i∈D
fi(c, ω) ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for all D ⊆ C (1)
For ω = 0, equation (1) is satisfied for each D ⊆ C. For ω = ∑i∈C ci, there
exists D ⊆ C such that
∑
i∈D
fi(ω, c) >
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st
by construction. Hence, there exists a largest ω1 such that
∑
ci∈D
qi(c, ω
1) ≤
∑
st∈Ng(D)
st for each D ⊆ C (2)
∑
ci∈D
qi(c, ω
1) =
∑
st∈Ng(D)
st for some D ⊆ C (3)
As
∑
t∈Ng(D) st is a submodular function of D, there exists a unique largest D
1
such that equation (2) holds. The allocation ϕf (s, c, g) = q is obtained by setting
qi = fi(c, ω
1) for each i ∈ D1
and assigning other agents their allocation in the reduced problem (s \Ng(D1), c \
D1, g \ (Ng(D1) ∪D1)). That is, we look for the largest ω2 > 0 such that
∑
i∈D
fi(c, ω
2) ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)\Ng(D1)
st for each D ⊆ C \D1 (4)
∑
i∈D
fi(c, ω
2) =
∑
t∈Ng(D)\Ng(D1)
st for some D ⊆ C \D1 (5)
Then, there exists a unique largest set D2 such that equation (4) holds. Observe
that ω2 ≥ ω1. Since if ω2 ≤ ω1, we combine equations (2) and (4) to obtain
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∑
ci∈D1∪D2
qi(c, ω
1) ≥
∑
ci∈D1
qi(c, ω
1) +
∑
ci∈D2
qi(c, ω
2) =
∑
st∈Ng(D1∪D2)
st
which contradicts the choice of D1 as the largest set satisfying equation (2).
Theorem 1. For each fairness principle f , the allocation rule ϕf obtained by the
ascending algorithm is pairwise f -robust.
Proof. Let (s, c, g) be an allocation problem, ϕf (s, c, g) = q, and i, j ∈ C. First,
suppose that the ascending algorithm assigns to i and j their allocations in the same
iteration step, which means qi = fi(c, ω) and qj = fj(c, ω) for ω > 0. Consider the
simple allocation problem ((ci, cj), qi+qj). Since f is consistent, f((ci, cj), qi+qj) =
(qi, qj). Hence, pairwise f -robustness is trivially satisfied.
Now, suppose that the ascending algorithm assigns to i and j their allocations
in different iteration steps, meanings qi = fi(c, ω) and qj = fj(c, ω
′) for ω, ω′ > 0,
which are the parameters obtained from the ascending algorithm. Assume without
loss of generality that ω′ > ω. By resource monotonicity, we have qi = fi(c, ω) ≤
fi(c, ω
′) and qj = fj(c, ω′) ≥ fj(c, ω). If one of these inequalities is not strict, then
f((ci, cj), qi + qj) = (qi, qj) by the same argument presented above. Hence, assume
that qi = fi(c, ω) < fi(c, ω
′) and qj = fj(c, ω′) > fj(c, ω). Let fi(c, ω′) = q¯i and
fj(c, ω) = q¯j . By consistency, we have f((ci, cj), qi+q¯j) = (qi, q¯j) and f((ci, cj), q¯i+
qj) = (q¯i, qj). Then, by resource monotonicity, we have fi((ci, cj), qi + qj) ≥ qi and
fj((ci, cj), qi + qj) ≤ qi. If one of these inequalities are weak, then pairwise f -
robustness is satisfied. Hence, assume that both are strict. Since the algorithm
assigns j’s allocation after i’s allocation, there is no feasible allocation q′ such that
for each k 6= i, j, qk = q′k and q′i > qi. The reason is that each citizen who receives
his allocation at some step h obtains no resource from the sources, he shares with
citizens who receive their allocations in the steps earlier than h. Hence, ϕf obtained
by the ascending algorithm is pairwise f -robust.
Theorem 2. For each fairness principle f , there exists a unique allocation rule ϕf
which is pairwise f -robust.
Proof. Let ϕf be the allocation rule given by the ascending algorithm. Suppose
there exists some other rule ϕ 6= ϕf which also satisfies pairwise f -robustness. Then,
there exists an allocation problem (s, c, g) such that ϕ(s, c, g) = q′ 6= q = ϕf (s, c, g).
Let D1, D2, ..., Dh be the set of citizens which are allocated in steps 1, 2, ..., h
of the ascending algorithm, respectively. Suppose that there exists i ∈ D1 such
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that q′i < qi. Then, qi = fi(c, ω) for some ω > 0. Let φ
′ be a flow which supports
the allocation q′. Consider the set of sources S1 = Ng(i) connected to i. Let
C1 = {j ∈ C : ∃t ∈ S1 such that φ′tj > 0}. This set is non-empty, because the
resources which were going to i in q, now must be allocated to other citizens which
share sources with i, due to the efficiency of the allocation q′.
If there exists j ∈ C1 such that q′j > fj(c, ω), then it is possible to transfer
some positive amount from j to i through the path jt, ti without changing the
allocations of citizens other than i and j, contradicting pairwise f -robustness.
So, suppose that for each citizen j ∈ C1, q′j ≤ fj(c, ω). Consider the set
S2 = Ng(C
1) and C2 = {j ∈ C : ∃t ∈ S2 such that φ′tj > 0}. Since q′i < qi and
for each citizen j ∈ C1, q′j ≤ fj(c, ω), C2 is non-empty. If there exists j ∈ C2
such that q′j > fj(c, ω), then it is possible to transfer some positive amount from
j to i through a path j2t2, t2j1, j1t1, t1i for some j2 ∈ C2, t2 ∈ S2, j1 ∈ C1,
and t1 ∈ S1, without changing the allocations of citizens other than i and j2,
contradicting pairwise f -robustness.
If there exists no j ∈ C2 such that q′j > fj(c, ω), then we continue iteratively
to look for a j such that q′j > qj . Such a j exists, because q
′
i < qi and the resource
allocation rule ϕ is efficient. Then, it is possible to make a transfer from j to i
without changing the allocations of other citizens.
If for each i ∈ D1, q′i ≥ qi, then we have q′i = qi for all i ∈ D1. Since q 6= q′,
there exists i ∈ Dh1 such that for each h2 < h1 and each j ∈ Dh2 , q′j = qj and we
can apply the same iterative argument starting from i to find a contradiction to
pairwise f -robustness.
Hence, ϕf is the unique allocation rule which is pairwise f -robust.
4 Three allocation rules
4.1 Egalitarian Allocation Rule
The first fairness principle we extend is egalitarianism.
Egalitarian Rule, e : For each P = (c, ω) ∈ P, egalitarian rule assigns an
allocation e(c, ω)= q such that for each i ∈ C, qi = min{ci, λ} where λ solves∑
i∈C min{ci, λ} = ω.
We extend egalitarianism to obtain the egalitarian allocation ruleϕe(s, c, g)=
q. Instead of the extension algorithm proposed in the previous section, we use an
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equivalent, but more revealing ascending algorithm based on the following system
E(λ) of inequalities where λ is a non-negative parameter.3
∑
j∈D
λ ∧ cj ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for all D ⊆ C (6)
For λ = 0, equation (6) is satisfied for each D ⊆ C. For λ =∞, there exists D ⊆ C
such that
∑
j∈D
λ ∧ cj >
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st
by construction. Hence, there exists a lowest λ1, strictly positive, such that
∑
j∈D
λ1 ∧ cj =
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for some D ⊆ C (7)
As
∑
t∈Ng(D) st is a submodular function of D, there exists a unique largest D
1 such
that equation (7) holds for. The egalitarian allocation ϕe(s, c, g) = q is obtained
by setting
qj = λ
1 ∧ cj for j ∈ D1
and assigning other agents their egalitarian allocation in the reduced problem (s \
Ng(D
1), c\D1, g \ (Ng(D1)∪D1)). That is, we look for the lowest λ2 > 0 such that∑
j∈D
λ2 ∧ cj =
∑
t∈Ng(D)\Ng(D1)
st for some D ⊆ C \D1 (8)
There exists a unique largest set D2 such that equation (8) holds for. If λ2 ≤ λ1,
we combine equations (7) and (8) to obtain
∑
j∈D1∪D2
λ1 ∧ cj ≥
∑
j∈D1
λ1 ∧ cj +
∑
j∈D2
λ2 ∧ cj =
∑
t∈Ng(D1∪D2)
st
which contradicts the choice of D1 as the largest set satisfying equation (7).
The egalitarian allocation rule is ϕe(s, c, g) = q obtained in the algorithm
above. For an example of the egalitarian allocation rule, see Figure 2.
3Note that for each λ ∈ R+, each c ∈ Rn+, and each j = 1, 2, ..., n, λ ∧ cj ≡ min{λ, cj}.
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t t t t
t t t t t t
s1 = 1 s2 = 1 s3 = 2 s4 = 2
c1 = 1 c2 = 1 c3 = 1 c4 = 2 c5 = 3 c6 = 5
ge1
(λ1 = 2
3
)
g
ge2
(λ2 = 4
3
)
Figure 2: Egalitarian allocation rule: For the allocation problem R = (s, c, g),
the egalitarian allocation is ϕe(s, c, g) = ( 2
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
). In the algorithm, the lowest λ1
satisfying equation (7) is 2
3
and the largest set satisfying equation (7) is D1 = {1, 2, 3}.
Then, the lowest λ2 satisfying equation (8) is 4
3
and the largest set satisfying equation (8)
is D2 = {4, 5, 6}.
4.2 Proportional Allocation Rule
The second fairness principle is proportionality.
Proportional Rule, p: For each P = (c, ω) ∈ P, proportional rule assigns an
allocation p(c, ω)= q = pic where pi = ω∑
i∈C ci
.
We obtain the proportional allocation rule ϕp(s, c, g)= q by an ascending
algorithm based on the following system P (pi) of inequalities where pi is a non-
negative parameter.
∑
i∈D
pi.ci ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for all D ⊆ C (9)
For pi = 0, equation (9) is satisfied for all D ⊆ C. For pi = 1 there exists D ⊆ C
such that
∑
i∈D
pi.ci >
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st
by construction. Hence, there exists a lowest pi1, strictly positive, such that
∑
i∈D
pi1.ci =
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for some D ⊆ C (10)
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As
∑
t∈Ng(D) st is a submodular function of D, there exists a unique largest D
1
such that equation(10) holds for. The proportional allocation rule ϕp(s, c, g) = q is
obtained by setting
qi = pi
1.ci for i ∈ D1
and assigning other agents their constrained proportional allocation in the reduced
problem (s \ Ng(D1), c \ D1, g \ (Ng(D1) ∪ D1)). That is, we look for the lowest
pi2 > 0 such that
∑
i∈D
pi2.ci =
∑
t∈Ng(D)\Ng(D1)
st for some D ⊆ C \D1 (11)
There exists a unique largest set D2 such that equation (11) holds for. If
pi2 ≤ pi1, we combine equations (10) and (11) to obtain
∑
i∈D1∪D2
pi1.ci ≥
∑
i∈D1
pi1.ci +
∑
i∈D2
pi2.ci =
∑
t∈Ng(D1∪D2)
st
which contradicts the choice of D1 as the largest set satisfying equation (10).
t t t t
t t t t t t
s1 = 1 s2 = 1 s3 = 2 s4 = 2
c1 = 1 c2 = 1 c3 = 1 c4 = 2 c5 = 3 c6 = 5
gp2
(pi2 = 1
2
)
g
gp1
(pi1 = 2
5
)
Figure 3: Proportional allocation rule: For the allocation problem R =
(s, c, g), the proportional allocation is ϕp(s, c, g) = ( 1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
, 1, 3
2
, 2). In the algorithm,
the lowest pi1 satisfying equation (10) is 1
2
and the largest set satisfying equation (10) is
D1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Then, the lowest pi2 satisfying equation (11) is 2
5
and the largest set
satisfying equation (11) is D2 = {6}.
The proportional allocation rule is ϕp(s, c, g) = q obtained in the algorithm
above. For an example of the proportional allocation rule, see Figure 3.
13
4.3 Equal Sacrifice Allocation Rule
The third fairness principle is egalitarianism in terms of the sacrifices required from
the agents.
Equal Sacrifice Rule, l : For each P = (c, ω) ∈ P, equal sacrifice rule assigns
an allocation l(c, ω)= q such that for each i ∈ C, qi = max{0, ci − σ} where σ
solves
∑
i∈C max{0, ci − σ} = ω.
We obtain the equal sacrifice allocation rule ϕl(s, c, g)= q by a descending
algorithm based on the following system S(σ) of inequalities where σ is a non-
negative parameter.4
∑
i∈D
0 ∨ (ci − σ) ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for all D ⊆ C (12)
For σ = ∞, equation (12) is satisfied for all D ⊆ C. For σ = 0 there exists
D ⊆ C such that
∑
i∈D
0 ∨ (ci − σ) >
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st
by construction. Hence, there exists a largest σ1 such that
∑
i∈D
0 ∨ (ci − σ1) =
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for some D ⊆ C (13)
As
∑
t∈Ng(D) st is a submodular function of D, there exists a unique largest
D1 such that equation(13) holds for. The equal sacrifice allocation ϕl(s, c, g) = q
is obtained by setting
qi = 0 ∨ (ci − σ1) for i ∈ D1
and assigning other agents their equal sacrifice allocation in the reduced problem
(s\Ng(D1), c\D1, g \ (Ng(D1)∪D1)). That is, we look for the largest σ2 > 0 such
that
∑
i∈D
0 ∨ (ci − σ2) =
∑
t∈Ng(D)\Ng(D1)
st for some D ⊆ C \D1 (14)
There exists a unique largest set D2 such that equation (14) holds for. If
σ2 ≥ σ1, we combine equations (13) and (14) to obtain
4Note that for each c ∈ Rn+ and each j = 1, 2, ..., n, 0 ∨ (ci − σ) ≡ max{0, cj − σ}.
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∑
i∈D1∪D2
0 ∨ (ci − σ1) ≥
∑
i∈D1
0 ∨ (ci − σ1) +
∑
i∈D2
0 ∨ (ci − σ2) =
∑
t∈Ng(D1∪D2)
st
which contradicts the choice of D1 as the largest set satisfying equation (13).
t t t t
t t t t t t
s1 = 1 s2 = 1 s3 = 2 s4 = 2
c1 = 1 c2 = 1 c3 = 1 c4 = 2 c5 = 3 c6 = 5
gl3
(σ3 = 2
3
)
g gl2(σ
2 = 1)
gl1
(σ1 = 3)
Figure 4: Equal sacrifice allocation rule: For the allocation problem R =
(s, c, g), the equal sacrifice allocation is ϕl(s, c, g) = ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1, 2, 2). In the algorithm,
the highest σ1 satisfying equation (13) is 3 and the largest set satisfying equation (13) is
D1 = {6}. Then, the highest σ2 satisfying equation (14) is 1 and the largest set satisfying
equation (14) is D2 = {4, 5}. Then, the highest σ3 satisfying equation (14*) (where D1 is
replaced with D1 ∪D2 in equation (14)) is 2
3
and the largest set satisfying equation (14*)
is D3 = {1, 2, 3}.
The equal sacrifice allocation rule is ϕl(s, c, g) = q obtained in the algorithm
above. For an example of the equal sacrifice allocation rule, see Figure 4.
5 Conclusion
Our results expand the scope of the existing literature on the claims problems.
We provide a unique way to apply fairness principles to allocation problems on
networks of sources and agents. Such problems with multiple sources are very
commonly observed as exemplified in the introduction.
Moreover, the network model brings new theoretical questions. For example
which axiomatic properties of simple rules carry over to allocation rules on net-
works? How can the axioms defined for simple allocations problems (e.g. no envy,
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composition up, consistency, etc.) can be extended to allocation rules on networks?
The egalitarian rule for network allocation problems has been characterized with
Pareto optimality, equal treatment of equals and strategy-proofness (Bochet et al.,
2010). Is it possible to give a characterization of rules on how they respond to
changes in the network structure? Similarly, the dual of an allocation problem
(Thomson, 2006) is well defined when there is only one source. Is it possible to
define the dual of an allocation problem on a network? In general, any question
which is relevant for simple allocation rules can now be asked for their extensions
on networks as provided by our algorithm.
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